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Abstract. Most allocation rules for network games presented in the literature assume that the
network structure is fixed. We put explicit emphasis on the construction of networks and examine
the dynamic formation of networks whose evolution across time periods is stochastic. Time-series
of networks are studied that describe processes of network formation where links may appear or
disappear at any period. Moreover, convergence to an efficient network is not necessarily prescribed.
Transitions from one network to another are random and ruled by a stochastic process, typically a
Markov chain. We propose the link-based scenario allocation rule for such dynamic random network
formation processes and provide its axiomatic characterization. By considering a monotone game
and a particular (natural) network formation process we recover the link-based flexible network
allocation rule of Jackson (2005a).
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1 Introduction
Interactions can be naturally modeled by networks, and consequently, successfully studied
with the support of network theory. Interacting individuals can be viewed as players that
are linked in a network and contribute to a total productive value or utility of the network.
One of the key questions in a cooperative setting is how to divide between the players
the value generated by the network. It means defining an allocation rule that specifies for
each member his share of the value of the network. Different proposals – both cooperative
and non-cooperative foundations of network allocation rules – have been proposed in the
literature. For more detailed surveys of the vast literature on allocation rules we refer, e.g.,
to Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001), Dutta and Jackson (2003), van den Nouweland
(2005), Jackson (2005b, 2008), and also to Section 5 of this paper.
⋆ This research is supported by the project DynaMITE (ANR-13-BSH1-0010-01), funded by National Agency for
Research (Agence Nationale de la Recherche). The authors thank cordially Matthew Jackson and participants
of the Summer Workshop in Economic Theory (SWET13) in Paris, in particular, Bernard Cornet, Anne van
den Nouweland and Myrna Wooders for helpful comments. Many thanks are due to the anonymous referees
whose insightful comments have permitted to greatly improve the manuscript.
⋆⋆ Corresponding author. Tel (+33) 14407-8285.
One of the crucial features of real-life social and economic interactions is the fact that
they are usually not static. Although dynamic networks, i.e., networks that evolve over
time, can be particularly useful for modeling such interactions, insufficient attention is still
paid to network dynamics. In particular, most allocation rules for network games usually
avoid dynamic aspects of network formation and assume that the network structure is
fixed. The key question is therefore how to distribute between players the value generated
by a dynamic network. Jackson (2005a) introduced a new class of allocation rules that take
into account the potential alternative constructions of the network, by assuming that the
efficient network will eventually emerge. He considered the so-called player-based flexible
network allocation rule and the link-based flexible network allocation rule. The latter one
is denoted here as the LBFN rule. However, in the approach used in Jackson (2005a),
even if the allocation is being decided upon when the network is formed or can still be
changed, the framework is still static, since the dynamics is just introduced in the fictive
construction/decomposition of the structure.
In the present work, we aim at putting explicit emphasis on the construction of net-
works whose evolution across time periods is stochastic and at studying how to distribute
between players the value generated by dynamic networks. The main contribution of the
paper is to introduce and characterize axiomatically an allocation rule for dynamic ran-
dom network formation processes. We are interested in the perspective of assigning values
to links rather than players, and consequently, our allocation rule is related to the LBFN
rule by Jackson (2005a). We call it the link-based allocation rule for dynamic random
network formation processes and denote it as the LBD allocation rule. While the LBFN
rule takes the value function into consideration in order to allocate the value, it neglects
which network is eventually achieved and how it is actually reached. Our LBD rule does
fill in this gap and takes into account both the marginal value of the links that the players
are involved in and the scenario, i.e., how active in the network formation process the
players are.
We study time-series of networks that describe processes of network formation where
several players or links may appear or disappear at any period. Convergence to one
of the efficient networks does not necessarily need to be prescribed. One of the basic
notions in our framework is the notion of a scenario of network formation processes
which is simply a sequence of networks that are observed at subsequent time periods. We
restrict our analysis to finite scenarios. A two-network sequence in a scenario is called a
transition and is elementary if the two networks differ from each other only by one link.
Transitions from one network to another are random and ruled by a stochastic process,
typically a Markov chain. A scenario allocation rule assigns to every value function a
vector of allocations for every player and every scenario. In order to specify how the
value generated by a dynamic process is distributed among players, an allocation rule for
dynamic network processes is defined as the expected value over all possible scenarios of
the scenario allocation rules. The LBD scenario allocation rule is equal to the sum of the
transition allocation rules over the transitions that form the given scenario. We provide
an axiomatic characterization of the LBD scenario allocation rule which is based on a
set of six natural axioms. We show that for a monotone game, the link-based flexible
network allocation rule of Jackson (2005a) coincides with our allocation rule associated
to the so-called natural network formation process. In such a process, all scenarios are
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equally probable, we start with the empty network and add one link at each step until
we get the complete network.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recapitulate basic
concepts on networks that will be used in the paper. In Section 3 our framework and
the link-based allocation rule for dynamic network processes are introduced. In Section
4 we establish the axiomatic characterization for this new allocation rule. In Section 5
we provide a short overview of the related literature. Section 6 presents some concluding
remarks. Proofs of the main results and independence of the axioms are presented in
Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.
2 Preliminaries on networks and allocation rules
In this section we recall some preliminaries and standard notations concerning networks
and allocation rules. Some notations related exclusively to our dynamic model will be
introduced in the next section.
Consider a fixed finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n} connected in some network
relationship. A network g is a set of pairs ij of players1 with i, j ∈ N , i 6= j,2 where ij ∈ g
indicates the presence of a link between players i and j. Networks under consideration
are undirected.
Two particular network relationships among players in N are easily identified: the
empty network g∅ without any link between players, and the complete network gN which
is the set of all possible subsets of N of size 2. Let G be the set of all possible network
relationships among players in N , i.e., G = {g|g ⊆ gN}.3 We use the following standard
set operations
g ∪ g′ = {ij | ij ∈ g or ij ∈ g′}
g ∩ g′ = {ij | ij ∈ g and ij ∈ g′}
g \ g′ = {ij | ij ∈ g and ij /∈ g′}
By g + ij we denote the network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g.
Similarly, g − ij is the network obtained by deleting link ij from an existing network g.
For two networks g and g′, g∆g′ denotes the symmetric difference, which is the set of
links where g and g′ differ, i.e.,
g∆g′ = (g ∪ g′) \ (g ∩ g′)
Let Li(g) denote the set of links that player i is involved in, and let ℓ(g) be the total
number of links in g, i.e.,
Li(g) = {ij | j ∈ N and ij ∈ g}, ℓi(g) = |Li(g)|, ℓ(g) =
1
2
∑
i
ℓi(g)
A value function on networks is a mapping v : G → R, assigning a real number
to any network. This could be for example the benefit or some worth generated by the
1 For convenience we use the shorthand notation ij for the pair {i, j}.
2 Loop ii is not a possibility in this setting.
3 Since N is fixed, in order to simplify the notation, we will use G instead of G(N).
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network. For simplicity, we denote v({ij}) and v({ij, . . . , kl}) by v(ij) and v(ij, . . . , kl),
respectively. Usually, a pair (N, v) consisting of a player set N and a value function v ∈ V
is called a network game. We denote by V (N) the set of all possible value functions on
N , or more simply V if N is understood.
A value function v is monotonic if v(g′) ≤ v(g) if g′ ⊆ g. Adding links to a network is
not detrimental to the value.
Given a value function v ∈ V , the monotonic cover of v is the value function vˆ such
that vˆ(g) = maxg′⊆g v(g
′). The idea is that the players in a given network g may use the
available links in any way they want in order to maximize the value generated. Note that
v is monotonic if and only if v = vˆ.
An important example of (monotonic) value functions are unanimity games. For any
network g ∈ G, its associated unanimity game ug is defined by
ug(g
′) =
{
1, if g′ ⊇ g
0, otherwise
As for TU-games, unanimity games form a basis of the set of network games for a fixed
N (simply because the set of links plays exactly the role of N), and the coefficients in
this basis are known as the Mo¨bius inverse or Harsanyi dividends, which we denote by
mv(g), g ⊆ gN , i.e., it holds
v =
∑
g⊆gN
mv(g)ug, (1)
for every v ∈ V , and one has mv(g) =
∑
g′⊆g(−1)
|g\g′|v(g′).
A network g is efficient relative to v if it maximizes v, i.e., v(g) ≥ v(g′) for all g′ ∈ G.
An allocation rule for a network game (N, v) specifies how the value generated by
any network g is allocated among players. Specifically, an allocation rule is a function
Y : G× V → Rn such that
∑
i Yi(g, v) = v(g) for all v and g.
Jackson (2005a) proposes, in particular, the player-based flexible network allocation
rule and the link-based flexible network allocation rule. Consider any v ∈ V and a network
g ∈ G. The link-based flexible network allocation rule is defined by
Y LBFNi (g, v) =
v(g)
vˆ(gN)
∑
j 6=i

 ∑
g′⊆gN−ij
1
2
(vˆ(g′ + ij)− vˆ(g′))
(
ℓ(g′)!(ℓ(gN)− ℓ(g′)− 1)!
ℓ(gN)!
)
(2)
Note that if g is efficient, then v(g) = vˆ(g) = vˆ(gN). Hence the normalization factor v(g)
vˆ(gN )
disappears.
Let us make some comments about this rule, which will motivate the construction
of our new rule. As far as we know, the LBFN rule is one of the few examples of an
allocation rule trying to take into account some dynamics of the network formation. It is
called “flexible” because it is considered that the network g under consideration, which
is not necessarily efficient, should evolve towards some efficient network. However, note
that the way this evolution is realized is ignored by the rule, as well as the true final
efficient network, which is not necessarily gN . Also, remark that g itself appears in the
formula only as a normalization factor, but not directly in the computation. Lastly, we
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observe that it is vˆ instead of v which is used in the formula. However, infinitely many
games have the same monotonic cover, hence the information conveyed by v is partially
ignored in the computation.
Based on these observations, we would like to propose an allocation rule which assumes
that the network is not fixed and does not suppose that eventually the complete network
or an efficient network will form. Rather, we consider that the evolution is free. Second,
this rule should take fully into account the information contained in v, as well as the
evolution of the network from the beginning to the end. As a conclusion, instead of
Y (g, v) or Y (gN , vˆ) we should have Y (G, v) where G is a “scenario” of network evolution,
or better Y (U, v), where U is some stochastic process ruling the evolution of the network
(see Subsection 3.1 for the formal definitions of G and U). This motivates the construction
we propose in the following sections.
3 Scenarios and dynamic network processes
3.1 General description
We assume that networks are evolving along time, at discrete time steps. The evolution
is ruled by some process, whose precise nature is outside the scope of this paper, and as
it will be seen, irrelevant to our study of an allocation rule. Formally, a dynamic network
process is a discrete stochastic process U , where U(st, gt) is the probability distribution
over G of gt+1, the network at time step t + 1, given the state of the system st at time
t and the current network gt. A simple and widely studied example of such processes
is the discrete Markov process, described briefly at the end of this subsection. Strategic
models of network formation, where players have incentives to create or delete links, can
in general be reduced to this general view of dynamic network processes.
A particular instance of the evolution of a network is called a scenario. Formally, a
scenario is a sequence of networks
G = g0, g1, g2, g3 . . .
where gt ∈ G for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . with the meaning that gt is the network observed at time
period t. Note that scenarios need not finish at the complete network gN , and a given
network may appear several times in a scenario. A normal scenario is such that g0 = g
∅.
We limit ourselves to scenarios of finite length, partly because of simplicity, but es-
sentially because the computation of an allocation to players necessarily involves a finite
horizon T for the observation of the evolution. We denote by S(T ) the (finite) set of all
scenarios of length T , T ∈ N.4
The dynamic network process being given, it is possible to compute the probability
P (G) of any scenario G ∈ S(T ). As it will become apparent in the sequel, only these
probabilities matter, so that we can identify the set of dynamic network processes with
the set of probability distributions over S(T ), which we denote by P(T ).
Any subsequence gt, gt+1 of subsequent networks in G is called a transition and will
be denoted by gt → gt+1. A transition gt → gt+1 is elementary if gt+1 differs from gt only
by one link.
4 For a discussion of a possibility to consider infinite scenarios produced by Markov processes, see Faigle and
Grabisch (2012).
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Example 1 Consider a small group consisting of 3 researchers in a lab: Agnieszka (A),
Jean-Franc¸ois (J) and Michel (M), i.e., we have N = {A, J,M}5. The lab wants to pro-
mote collaboration among its members by announcing regular calls for 2-person projects.
A link between any two researchers means submitting a project by these two researchers
for getting a grant. An example of a normal finite scenario is
G = g∅, {AM}, {AJ, JM}, gN , {AM}, {AJ,AM}
where each network appearing in this scenario corresponds to the set of the projects
submitted for a given call. Consequently, in the scenario G, first Agnieszka and Michel
decide to submit a project, but they do not resubmit anything for the next call, where
two other projects are submitted: one by Agnieszka and Jean-Franc¸ois, and another one
by Jean-Franc¸ois and Michel. Then, at the next call, every pair submits a project. Next,
only Agnieszka and Michel submit a project, and finally for the last call, Agnieszka and
Jean-Franc¸ois as well as Agnieszka and Michel submit two projects.
In the scenario G, three transitions are elementary, i.e.,
g∅ → {AM}, {AJ, JM} → gN , {AM} → {AJ,AM}
and the remaining two transitions are not elementary, i.e.,
{AM} → {AJ, JM}, gN → {AM}
A value function v can be defined, where v(g) depends on the CV’s of the researchers
involved and the quality of their cooperation. We can assume that v(g∅) = 0. Figure 1
presents an example of such a value function v.
J
J
J
J J
J J
J
A
AA A
AA A
A
M
MM M
MM M
M
v = 0
v = 2v = 1 v = 3
v = 6v = 5 v = 10
v = 12
Fig. 1. The 8 possible networks with their value.
5 Any resemblance with existing persons is purely accidental.
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Let us apply the link-based flexible network allocation rule (2) to this example. We
note that the efficient network is the complete network, and that v is monotone, so that
it coincides with vˆ. We are therefore in a simple case for the computation of the LBFN
rule, and most of the drawbacks we pointed out in the foregoing section disappear. We
find the following allocation:
Y LBFNA = 3.75, Y
LBFN
M = 5, Y
LBFN
J = 3.25.
We observe that M gets the highest reward, then A and J . This allocation well reflects
the value function v, in the sense that the order obtained corresponds to the order implied
by the marginal values of the links where A, J andM are involved. One may say that this
result is therefore satisfactory, however, it does not reflect the scenario that has actually
realized. Indeed, one can check that the researchers are not equally active in the scenario:
counting +1 whenever a researcher becomes active (i.e., participates to a project to which
he/she did not participate at previous step) and −1 whenever he/she becomes inactive,
we find the following counts: +2 for Agnieszka, and +1 for Michel and Jean-Franc¸ois.
Somehow, these “activity counts” should be reflected by the allocation, which is not the
case for the LBFN rule. The example shows that a rule taking both aspects (a kind of
marginal value and the scenario) into account is needed. ♦
Among the stochastic processes, of particular interest are the stationary Markov pro-
cesses, where the probability of transition from one network to another depends only on
the current network instead of the whole history (i.e., the state s of the system is simply
the current network), and these probabilities are independent of time. Denoting by pgg′
the probability of transition from g to g′, it follows that the probability of occurrence of
a finite scenario G = g0, g1, g2, . . . , gT is given by
P (G) = Pr(g0)
T∏
t=1
pgt−1gt (3)
where Pr(g0) is the probability of occurrence of the initial state g0. Note that if the
process converges to an absorbing network g at time T ′, we have pgg′ = 0 for all g
′ 6= g
and pgg = 1, so that the corresponding scenario, if observed on a horizon T ≥ T
′, has
the same probability for any T ≥ T ′. In this sense, all scenarios corresponding to a
convergence of the process at some time T ′ ≤ T are present in S(T ).
3.2 The link-based allocation rule for dynamic network processes
Next, we will introduce our allocation rule for the dynamic network process described
above. First, we start with general definitions.
Definition 1 Let V be the set of value functions and S be the set of finite scenarios. A
scenario allocation rule is a mapping ψ : V → RN×S, with components of ψ(v) denoted
by ψGi for player i and scenario G.
Definition 2 Let ψ be a scenario allocation rule. The allocation rule for dynamic network
processes on a finite horizon T induced by ψ is a mapping Ψ : V × P(T ) → Rn which
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assigns to every value function and probability distribution the expected value over all
possible scenarios of the scenario allocation rules, i.e.,
Ψ (v, P ) :=
∑
G∈S(T )
P (G)ψG(v)
where P (G) is the probability of occurrence of scenario G, according to the probability
distribution P ∈ P(T ).
We introduce and characterize the so-called link-based allocation rule for dynamic
network processes, denoted by Φ and abbreviated by the LBD (allocation) rule (LBD =
link-based dynamic), which is induced by φG , the LBD scenario allocation rule. We give
first an informal definition of the rule limited to transitions:
– If the transition g → g′ is elementary (i.e., g′ differs from g only by one link, say ij),
then
φg→g
′
i = φ
g→g′
j =
1
2
(v(g′)− v(g))
and for all other players φg→g
′
k = 0.
– If the transition is not elementary, we take the average over all possible shortest paths
formed of elementary transitions from g to g′.
In order to get a formal definition, we introduce some additional concepts and nota-
tions.
Definition 3 A player i is adjacent to graph g if he is adjacent to some link in g, i.e.,
there exists j ∈ N such that ij ∈ g. We denote it by i ⇀ g or g ↼ i. Similarly, a link ij
is adjacent to a graph g if either i ⇀ g or j ⇀ g. We denote it by ij ⇀ g or g ↼ ij.
Consider a transition g → g′. Links in g′ but not in g are called entering links,
while those in g but not more in g′ are called leaving links. In order to obtain compact
formulations, we introduce the signed version of links and set of links. Considering a
transition g → g′, entering links λ ∈ g′ \ g have a positive sign, while leaving links have a
negative sign. The signed version of a link λ is denoted by ελ, with ε = − or + depending
whether λ is leaving or entering. Similarly, if h is a set of links (graph), εh is the set of
signed links6. As a consequence, writing g+εij means g+ ij if ε = + (entering) and g−ij
if ε = − (leaving). Similarly, g+εh stands for the less readable (g∪h+)\h− with h+ (resp.
h−) the set of entering (resp. leaving) links in h. Note that the “+” operation acts like
the usual addition, e.g., g+ ij− ij = g, except that it is idempotent: g+ ij+ ij = g+ ij,
g − ij − ij = g − ij. Also, note that g − εij = g + ij if ε = −.
In summary, entering and leaving links form the set g∆g′, which could be called the
set of active links in transition g → g′. Accordingly, one can define active players.
Definition 4 A player i is said to be active in a transition g → g′ if he is adjacent to
g∆g′ (in symbols: i ⇀ g∆g′), otherwise i is said to be inactive in the transition g → g′.
Under these conventions we can introduce the following definition:
6 We are conscious that the notation is ambiguous, but it should cause no problem since sets of links are denoted
by g, g′, h, h′, etc.
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Definition 5 The link-based allocation rule for dynamic network processes on a finite
horizon T (the LBD allocation rule) Φ is defined as
Φ(v, P ) :=
∑
G∈S(T )
P (G)φG(v) (4)
and φG is the LBD scenario allocation rule given by
φG(v) =
T−1∑
k=0
φgk→gk+1(v) (5)
with G = g0, g1, g2, . . . , gT and
φg→g
′
i (v) =
{
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ
∑
ik∈g∆g′(v(g + εh
ik
σ )− v(g + εh
ik
σ − εik)), if i ⇀ g∆g
′
0, otherwise
(6)
where σ is any permutation on the set of links g∆g′ = {λ1, . . . , λ|g∆g′|}, and h
ik
σ is the
first set in the sequence {λσ(1)}, {λσ(1), λσ(2)}, . . . , g∆g
′ containing ik.
Note that inactive players receive 0.
Remark 1 It is important to note that the two levels (the allocation rule level and the
scenario allocation rule level) work independently. That is, on the allocation rule level, the
transitions between networks obey a stochastic process, which determines the probability
of transitions of a network g into another network g′. This stochastic process typically
results of the behavior of the players and, in a sense, comes from the players taken as
individuals. By contrast, on the scenario rule level, for a given transition g → g′, one
has to define in a proper way how the benefit/loss of the transition (i.e., v(g′)− v(g)) is
shared among the players who are active in the transition. This could be seen as a basic
rule imposed by the “network”, i.e., by the players considered as a society, and which
therefore operates on a different level. If one imposes symmetry in the sharing (no player
has a special advantage, only v and the structure of the network matter), our axiomatiza-
tion shows that we are led to compute, for a nonelementary transition, the (unweighted)
average over all possibilities of starting from g and arriving at g′ by elementary transi-
tions, regardless of the probabilities of those elementary transitions stemming from the
stochastic process.
A first result is that we can recover the link-based flexible network allocation rule of
Jackson (2005a) by considering a special process, called the natural process.
Definition 6 The natural process is a process of network formation defined by:
- the process starts with the empty network, i.e., g0 = g
∅
- we add one link at each step until we obtain the complete graph gN
- all scenarios are of length η and are equally probable, i.e., P (G) = 1
η!
for each G ∈ S(η),
where η =
(
n
2
)
.
Proposition 1 Assume v is a monotone game. Then for g = gN , the Y LBFN rule coin-
cides with Φ associated to the natural process.
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Proof: When v is monotone, the Y LBFN rule reduces to
Y LBFNi (g
N , v) =
∑
j 6=i
[ ∑
g′⊆gN−ij
1
2
(v(g′ + ij)− v(g′))
(ℓ(g′)!(η!− ℓ(g′)− 1)!
η!
)]
Take player i and count his contribution ∆i in each scenario. Consider scenario G. Since
gN is complete, player i has degree n − 1, and therefore ∆i is non null in exactly n − 1
transitions of the scenario where links ij are added, j = 1, . . . , i − 1, i+ 1, . . . , n. When
the link ij is added, we find
∆i =
1
2
(
v(g′ + ij)− v(g′)
)
where g′ is the last graph without ij in G. For a fixed g′, there are ℓ(g′)! paths from the
empty graph to g′, and (η− ℓ(g′)−1)! paths from g′+ ij to the complete graph gN , hence
the result. 
Example 1 (ctd.) Consider the scenario G given in Example 1. By virtue of (5), we
have
φG(v) = φg
∅→{AM}(v)+φ{AM}→{AJ,JM}(v)+φ{AJ,JM}→g
N
(v)+φg
N→{AM}(v)+φ{AM}→{AJ,AM}(v)
The symmetric differences and players adjacent to them are the following:
g∅∆{AM} = {AM}, {AM}∆{AJ, JM} = gN , {AJ, JM}∆gN = {AM}
gN∆{AM} = {AJ, JM}, {AM}∆{AJ,AM} = {AJ}
A,M ⇀ {AM}, A, J,M ⇀ gN
A, J,M ⇀ {AJ, JM}, A, J ⇀ {AJ}
Let us apply (6) to the example. First, for the elementary transitions we have
φ
g∅→{AM}
A (v) = φ
g∅→{AM}
M (v) =
v(AM)
2
, φ
g∅→{AM}
J (v) = 0
φ
{AJ,JM}→gN
A (v) = φ
{AJ,JM}→gN
M (v) =
v(gN)− v(AJ, JM)
2
, φ
{AJ,JM}→gN
J (v) = 0
φ
{AM}→{AJ,AM}
A (v) = φ
{AM}→{AJ,AM}
J (v) =
v(AJ,AM)− v(AM)
2
, φ
{AM}→{AJ,AM}
M (v) = 0
Consider now the (not elementary) transition {AM} → {AJ, JM}. There are six
shortest sequences of elementary transitions between {AM} and {AJ, JM}, as presented
in Figure 2. The red/green/blue arrows in this figure indicate the transitions where
A/J/M is active.
We have then
φ
{AM}→{AJ,JM}
A (v) =
1
12
[v(AJ)−v(AM)−v(AM)+v(AJ, JM)−v(JM)+v(AJ)−v(AM)+
10
JJ
J
J J
J J
J
A
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AA A
A
M
MM M
MM M
M
Fig. 2. The shortest sequences of elementary transitions between {AM} and {AJ, JM} and their active players
(red/green/blue arrows indicate the transitions where A/J/M is active).
v(AJ,AM)−v(AM)+v(AJ, JM)−v(gN )+v(AJ, JM)−v(AM, JM)+v(AJ, JM)−v(AM, JM)]
=
1
12
[
v(AJ,AM)− v(JM)− v(gN) + 2(v(AJ)− v(AM, JM)) + 4(v(AJ, JM)− v(AM))
]
φ
{AM}→{AJ,JM}
J (v) =
1
12
[v(AJ, JM)+v(AJ, JM)+v(AJ,AM)−v(AM)+v(AJ, JM)−v(AJ)
+v(gN)− v(AM) + v(AM, JM)− v(AM) + v(AJ, JM)− v(JM) + v(gN)− v(AM)] =
=
1
12
[
2v(gN) + 4v(AJ, JM) + v(AJ,AM) + v(AM, JM)− v(JM)− v(AJ)− 4v(AM)
]
φ
{AM}→{AJ,JM}
M (v) =
1
12
[−v(AM) + v(AJ, JM)− v(AJ) + 2(v(JM)− v(AM))+
+2(v(AJ, JM)− v(AJ,AM)) + v(AM, JM)− v(AM) + v(AJ, JM)− v(gN)] =
=
1
12
[
v(AM, JM) + 2(v(JM)− v(AJ,AM)) + 4(v(AJ, JM)− v(AM))− v(gN)− v(AJ)
]
In a similar way we can calculate φ
gN→{AM}
i (v) for i ∈ N . We have then
φ
gN→{AM}
A (v) =
1
4
[
−v(gN) + v(AM, JM)− v(AJ,AM) + v(AM)
]
φ
gN→{AM}
J (v) =
1
2
[
v(AM)− v(gN)
]
φ
gN→{AM}
M (v) =
1
4
[
−v(AM, JM) + v(AM)− v(gN)) + v(AJ,AM)
]
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Note that for our scenario G we have φGA+φ
G
J +φ
G
M = v(AJ,AM). In the next section
we will show that the LBD scenario allocation rule is indeed efficient.
With the specific values v(g) for all g given in Figure 1 and scenario G, the LBD
scenario allocation rule gives the following distribution:
φGA = 3.75, φ
G
M = 1.5, φ
G
J = 0.75.
The first difference between the LBD scenario allocation rule and the link-based flexible
network allocation rule concerns the value distributed. The former one distributes the
difference of value between the end network and the first in the scenario (in this case, 6),
whereas the latter distributes the value of the efficient network under v (which is 12). The
second striking difference between both allocation rules is that despite the experience and
the central role of Michel reflected by the value function v, the LBD scenario allocation
rule gives a larger share to Agnieszka, which is, as we have seen, the most active player
under the scenario G: her activity count is +2, while Michel and Jean-Franc¸ois have
only +1. The link-based flexible allocation (LBFN) rule takes the value function into
consideration in order to allocate the value but neglects which network is eventually
achieved and how it is actually reached. This can be clearly explained by Proposition 1.
Indeed, the LBFN rule supposes implicitly that the natural process has realized, i.e., all
scenarios from the empty network to the complete network with elementary transitions
are considered, which results in an equal activity count for all agents. The advantage of
the LBD rule is that only specific scenarios, without any restriction, can be considered.
♦
4 Axiomatization of the LBD scenario allocation rule
Next, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the LBD scenario allocation rule. As
introduced in Definition 1, ψG denotes a scenario allocation rule for scenario G.
Definition 7 Two sequences G = g0, . . . , gq,G
′ = g′0, . . . , g
′
r are said to be concatenable
if gq = g
′
0, in which case their concatenation is the sequence
G ⊕ G ′ := g0, . . . , gq, g
′
1, . . . , g
′
r.
Concatenation (C): Let G,G ′ be two concatenable sequences. Then
ψG⊕G
′
= ψG + ψG
′
.
Axiom (C) allows to restrict our attention to transitions. Indeed,
ψG =
T−1∑
k=0
ψgk→gk+1
holds for every sequence G = g0, g1, . . . , gT .
Basically, the axiom says that it is equivalent to pay allocation to players on an ‘every
day basis’ (at each transition), or for a given long period of time (the whole scenario). In
a scenario with networks evolving over time, the activity of a player in every transition
of the scenario, i.e., in every stage of the network evolution, counts for the allocation to
the player received in the whole dynamic process.
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Efficiency (E): For any finite scenario G = g0, g1, . . . , gT it holds
∑
i∈N ψ
G
i =
v(gT )− v(g0).
We take the perspective that for a scenario the difference between the values of the
last and the first network in that scenario has to be allocated. Every transition in a given
scenario is important as it is part of the network evolution. A natural way to evaluate
the payoff of a transition is to consider the difference between the new and the previous
network of the transition. Taking the sum of these difference payoffs over all transitions
is a collapsing sum that leads to the difference between the value of the last and the first
network. An alternative perspective could be to take the sum over all networks of the
scenario, which would mean that the accumulated values of the networks is meaningful.
Our view is however more on the dynamic side, as we think that only the variation is
meaningful.
Note that our efficiency axiom is not related to the concept of network efficiency or
Pareto efficiency, as (E) does not involve a comparison of networks, but it concerns the
value allocated among players without wastage.
Next we impose the linearity axiom, which is very common in the literature of allo-
cation rules and values of games.
Linearity for transitions (L): v 7→ ψg→g
′
(v) is a linear operator for any transi-
tion g → g′.
Linearity for transitions states that it is sufficient to study allocations on transitions
on a linear basis for V , where V denotes the set of all possible value functions.
Inactive player (IP): If i is inactive in g → g′, then ψg→g
′
i (v) = 0 for any v.
By Definition 4, inactive players in a transition do not see any change in their links,
and therefore are not concerned in this transition. It is then natural that they receive no
allocation.
Definition 8 A link ij is null for v if v(g + ij) = v(g) for every g 6∋ ij.
For any graph g and game v, the graph g∗ is the graph where all links which are null for
v have been deleted.
It should be remarked that a link is active or inactive, depending on the transition
g → g′ (see Definition 4), and it is null or nonnull, depending on the value function
v. These are therefore two independent notions, and according to our notation, (g∆g′)∗
denotes the graph of all active and nonnull links in the transition g → g′, relative to the
value function v. This graph will play a central role in the next axioms.
Definition 9 Two distinct links ij, kl are symmetric for v if for every graph g not con-
taining them, it holds v(g + ij) = v(g + kl).
Degree axiom (D): Consider a transition g → g′ and a game v. If all links in
(g′ \ g)∗ are pairwise symmetric for v, then for all players i not adjacent to some
link in (g \ g′)∗, the allocation given to i is proportional to its degree in (g∆g′)∗:
ψg→g
′
i (v) = αℓi((g∆g
′)∗),
for some α ∈ R (and similarly when inverting “entering” and “leaving”).
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Essentially, the axiom says that, first, null links have no contribution in the allocation
to players, and second, that in a situation where all entering links have the same effect
on the value function (symmetry), every player who does not have leaving links should
receive an amount proportional to the number of its entering links (and similarly for
leaving links)7.8
Note that from the logical point of view, the condition “If all links in (g′ \ g)∗ are
pairwise symmetric” is vacuously satisfied when there is no nonnull entering links or only
one (and similarly for leaving links). Hence, the axiom covers a wide range of situations.
In particular, a player with no nonnull links would receive 0, as its degree is 0. Also, if
there is only one nonnull entering (or leaving) link ij and that i, j are not adjacent to
leaving links, then i and j receive the same allocation.
Lastly, note that the above axiom does not imply the (IP) axiom. Indeed, a player who
is inactive in a transition g → g′ receives 0, even if the links in g′ \ g are not symmetric.
The axiom says nothing for players adjacent to both entering and leaving links. This
is the target of the next axiom, and in order to introduce it, an additional property of
links is needed.
Definition 10 Two distinct links ij, kl are antisymmetric for v if v(g + ij + kl) = v(g)
for every graph g not containing them.
Remark 2 Observe from the definitions that if λ, λ′ are antisymmetric and λ′, λ′′ are
symmetric, then λ, λ′′ are antisymmetric as well.
Antisymmetry for entering/leaving links (ASEL): Consider a transition
g → g′ and a game v. If all links in (g′ \ g)∗ are pairwise symmetric for v, as
well as all links in (g \ g′)∗, and if any pair of links λ ∈ (g′ \ g)∗, λ′ ∈ (g \ g′)∗
are antisymmetric, then for any player i ⇀ g∆g′, the allocation given to i is
proportional to its degree in (g∆g′)∗:
ψg→g
′
i (v) = αℓi((g∆g
′)∗),
for some α ∈ R.
As for (D), null links have no impact on the allocation to players, and the axiom describes
a situation where entering links have the same effect on the value function, and similarly
for leaving links. The new aspect described by the axiom is how to compare the contri-
bution of leaving and entering links. From Definition 10, two antisymmetric links ij, kl
which enter the network annihilate each other, which can be interpreted by saying that
they bring the same contribution but of opposite sign, say +δ,−δ respectively. Therefore,
if we interpret a leaving link as a loss and an entering link as a gain, it turns out that if
ij is leaving and kl is entering, their contribution in the transition g → g′ becomes equal:
−(+δ) = −δ (and similarly if ij is entering and kl is leaving).
7 The proportionality constant depends on v. It may be negative or even equal to 0 (see the expression of K
given by (8) in the proof of Proposition 2).
8 One may wish to distinguish in two different axioms the fact that null links have no contribution and the
symmetry aspect. We would have then, say a null link axiom (NL), saying that if ij is null for v, then
ψg→g
′
(v) = ψg\ij→g
′\ij(v), and the modified degree axiom (D’) with g∆g′ replacing (g∆g′)∗.
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Note that (ASEL) does not imply the (D) axiom, because (D) can be applied to a
transition g → g′ having both entering links and leaving links, where entering links are
pairwise symmetric, but not necessarily those which are leaving.
Lastly, due to Remark 2, observe that one can replace in the above axiom “any pair
of links λ ∈ (g′ \ g)∗, λ′ ∈ (g \ g′)∗ are antisymmetric” by “there exists a pair of links
λ ∈ (g′ \ g)∗, λ′ ∈ (g \ g′)∗ which are antisymmetric”.
We illustrate axioms (IP), (D) and (ASEL) with the following example.
Example 2 We consider a network with 7 players and a transition between g and g′, as
described on Figure 3.
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g∆g′
Fig. 3. Example of a transition g → g′. Left: The two networks g, g′. Right: The graph g∆g′. Entering links are
in solid lines, and leaving links are in dotted lines. Players 2 and 6 are inactive, and by (IP) receive 0.
First, we notice that players 2 and 6 are not adjacent to any link in g∆g′, i.e., they
are inactive players, and therefore receive 0 ((IP) axiom). In the rest of the discussion,
we discard them and concentrate on active players. Suppose now that links 34 and 14 are
null. Then players 3 and 4 have no links, and by the Degree axiom, we get ψg→g
′
3 (v) =
ψg→g
′
4 (v) = 0.
Next, suppose that links 14 and 15 are null. Then there is only one entering link (34),
players 3 and 4 are not adjacent to leaving links, so that without further assumption on
symmetry, (D) implies that ψg→g
′
3 (v) = ψ
g→g′
4 (v). If moreover, 17 and 57 and symmetric,
axiom (D) can be applied to players 1, 5 and 7:
2ψg→g
′
1 (v) = 2ψ
g→g′
5 (v) = ψ
g→g′
7 (v).
Lastly, suppose there is no null link. If links 34, 14 and 15 are pairwise symmetric,
if links 17 and 57 are symmetric, and if 34 and 17 are antisymmetric (and therefore
by Remark 2, any pair of entering and leaving links are antisymmetric), we deduce by
(ASEL) that
ψg→g
′
1 (v) = 3ψ
g→g′
3 (v) =
3
2
ψg→g
′
4 (v) =
3
2
ψg→g
′
5 (v) =
3
2
ψg→g
′
7 (v).
♦
Proposition 2 The LBD scenario allocation rule satisfies (C), (E), (L), (IP), (D) and
(ASEL).
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For the proof, see Appendix A.
Theorem 1 The LBD scenario allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying
(C), (E), (L), (IP), (D) and (ASEL).
For the proof, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider the unanimity game uh, h 6= ∅. Then the following holds:
(i) A link ij is nonnull for uh if and only if ij ∈ h;
(ii) A pair of links ij, kl is symmetric for uh if and only if both ij, kl ∈ h or both ij, kl 6∈ h.
Proof: (i) Take ij ∈ h. Then ij is nonnull since uh(h) 6= uh(h − ij). Conversely, take
ij 6∈ h. Then uh(g) = uh(g − ij) for every g.
(ii) Assume |h| ≥ 2 and consider ij, kl ∈ h two distinct links. Then for any g not
containing them, uh(g + ij) = uh(g + kl) = 0. Now assume |g
N \ h| ≥ 2 and consider
ij, kl 6∈ h two distinct links. Then for any g not containing them, uh(g+ij) = uh(g+kl) =
uh(g). Conversely, for h 6= g
N , take ij ∈ h and kl 6∈ h. Then 1 = uh(h − ij + ij) 6=
uh(h− ij + kl) = 0, hence these links are not symmetric. 
For the proof of Theorem 1, see Appendix A. The independence of the axioms is
shown in Appendix B.
5 Related literature
In this section we present a brief literature overview of different network allocation rules.
Also some of the more recent works that will be mentioned below provide (short) surveys
on this issue.
In the seminal work by Myerson (1977) a cooperative game with transferable utilities
has been supplemented by a network structure which can be seen as the communication
lines between players. In the literature that followed his work the terms communication
structures and communication games are usually used. Myerson (1977) introduced and
characterized an allocation rule, an extension of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) to
communication games, which is now called the Myerson value (see also, e.g., Myerson
(1980), Aumann and Myerson (1988)). Meessen (1988) proposed an alternative rule for
communication situations, called the position value, which has been then characterized
by Borm et al. (1992) on the class of communication situations in which the graph is
cycle-free. Slikker (2005a,b) provided two characterizations of this value without such
restrictions on the graph. Hamiache (1999) presented another rule for communication
situations; see also Bilbao et al. (2006). Allocation rules for hypergraph communication
situations were studied by van den Nouweland et al. (1992). While Dutta et al. (1998)
considered a class of external allocation rules that contains the Myerson value where
forming communication links is costless, Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000b) used
a natural extension of the Myerson value to determine the payoffs to the players in
communication situations with costs for establishing links.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced a class of games (called network games)
where the value generated depends directly on the network structure, and showed that the
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Myerson value has a direct extension from communication games to network games. They
defined the egalitarian allocation rule and the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule.
Slikker (2007) characterized axiomatically the Myerson value, the position value and the
component-wise egalitarian solution, and also proposed three non-cooperative bargaining
procedures that result in the same payoffs as the three rules. For other works concerning
non-cooperative foundations of allocation rules, we should mention, e.g., Pe´rez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2001) who presented an implementation of the Shapley value, and Pe´rez-
Castrillo and Wettstein (2005) who described a mechanism that ends in the Myerson
value of the monotonic cover of the value function.
Caulier (2010) considered a rule that provides payoffs to links, where these payoffs
are then divided equally over players. He followed Shapley’s characterization for this al-
location procedure to the links. The weighted Shapley value defined by Kalai and Samet
(1987) was generalized to communication situations in Haeringer (1999) and to hierar-
chical structures in Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000a). van den Nouweland and
Slikker (2012) characterized the position value for network situations where no condition
on the underlying network is required. Ghintran (2013) generalized the position value by
taking into account the negotiation power of players on the allocation of the worth. She
characterized this new weighted position value for communication situations with cycle-
free networks. For a similar approach, see also, e.g., Haeringer (2006) who considered
allocation rules for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Ghintran et al. (2012)
generalized the position value defined for the class of deterministic communication situ-
ations, to the class of generalized probabilistic communication situations, and provided
two characterizations of this allocation rule.
Although there exists a vast literature on modeling interactions by social and economic
networks, the issue of network dynamics has still not received enough attention. The main
difference between the works mentioned above and our LBD scenario allocation rule lies in
the dynamic aspect of our framework: while the allocation rules presented in the literature
assume that the network structure is fixed, the LBD scenario allocation rule is defined
for dynamic random network formation processes. An approach similar to ours but used
for coalition processes is applied in Faigle and Grabisch (2012, 2013).
Examples of the dynamic approach to interactions are presented, e.g., in some ex-
tensions of the Jackson-Wolinsky connections model to a dynamic framework; see e.g.,
Jackson and Watts (2002), Watts (2001, 2002). Konishi and Ray (2003) considered a
dynamic model of coalition formation when players are farsighted. As explained above,
the important contribution to the dynamic aspect of network formation can be found
in Jackson (2005a). A model of dynamic network formation with farsighted players was
studied by Dutta et al. (2005). They defined a concept of equilibrium which takes into
account farsighted behavior of players and allows for limited cooperation amongst them.
Page et al. (2005) introduced a dynamic framework of network formation and analyzed
farsightedly consistent directed networks. They studied the notion of a supernetwork
which is a collection of directed networks and represents coalitional preferences and rules
governing network formation. Page and Wooders (2009) introduced a model of network
formation with a set of feasible networks, player preferences, rules of network formation
and a dominance relation on feasible networks. The authors characterized sets of network
outcomes that are likely to emerge and persist. Also Herings et al. (2009) addressed the
question which networks one might expect to emerge in the long run when players are
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farsighted. They provided a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable
sets of networks. More recent work on a dynamic allocation rule in farsighted network
formation is presented in Navarro (2013). Page and Wooders (2007) modeled club struc-
tures as bipartite networks and formulated the problem of club formation as a game of
network formation. They identified club networks that are stable if players are farsighted,
and club networks that are stable if players are myopic. Page and Wooders (2010) for-
mulated club formation with multiple memberships as a noncooperative game of network
formation and identified conditions sufficient to guarantee that the game has a potential
function. In the domain of strategic network formation, Haller et al. (2007) specifies the
conditions under which Nash networks exist in the connection model with two-way flow
of information and without information decay. Under incomplete information, Harrison
and Mun˜oz (2015) present a specific coalitional refinement of Nash equilibrium based on
global games theory, and Song and van der Schaar (forthcoming) study which network
structure can emerge in equilibrium and is stable when the agents do not know in advance
the value of linking.
Another branch of the literature closely related in spirit to this paper concerns dy-
namic cooperative games. Oviedo (2000) investigates the core of a repeated cooperative
game, i.e., a repeated game where in each round the agents play a cooperative game.
The author shows that the core of a repeated cooperative game contains the core of the
original cooperative game. Also Kranich et al. (2005) study the core when cooperation
takes place in a dynamic setting and define three different concepts of the core for dy-
namic TU-games: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak sequential
core. While Predtetchinski (2007) examines the strong sequential core for stationary co-
operative games and proves its non-emptiness under some conditions, Habis and Herings
(2010) consider the weak sequential core. Habis and Herings (2011) introduce the concept
of a transferable utility game with uncertainty and characterize the weak sequential core
in this game. They show the non-emptiness of the weak sequential core under some con-
dition. Habis and Herings (2013) study stochastic bankruptcy games and use the weak
sequential core as a solution concept for such games. Lehrer and Scarsini (2013) consider
dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to
the history of allocations. They define and characterize the concept of intertemporal core.
Although the common feature of the literature mentioned above and the present
paper concerns the dynamic aspects of interactions, to the best of our knowledge no
previous study deals with a similar allocation rule for dynamic random network formation
processes.
6 Concluding remarks
We have considered the dynamic random network formation processes, where links may
appear and disappear at any time, and a scenario of the process, i.e., a sequence of net-
works, is the result of a stochastic process, typically a Markov chain. We have established
the characterization of the scenario allocation rule for dynamic network processes based
on a set of natural axioms. We have shown that if a monotone game is considered, then
the link-based flexible network allocation rule of Jackson (2005a) coincides with our LBD
link-based allocation rule associated to the so-called natural process.
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Our framework of dynamic network formation can naturally model situations with the
set of active players changing over time, where individuals appear or disappear during
the process: some players may become involved in later periods of the network formation
process, some others can be “active” all the time, some individuals may appear only for a
short period of time and disappear forever, or appear again after some time of “silence”,
etc. When allocating value generated by the dynamic networks we take into account
all players that were ever involved in the dynamic network formation process. Hence,
many real-life dynamic interactions with appearing/disappearing actors can naturally be
modeled by our framework.
There are several directions for follow-up research on this subject. While we have
presented the LBD allocation rule which is “fair” in the sense that it is symmetric,
we could consider a weighted version of the rule by introducing additionally weights to
players when allocating the value among them. For instance, in our Example 1, a rule
to reward researchers’ involvement in enhancing cooperation could violate symmetry, by
taking into account the individuals’ frequency of professional missions or their needs for
more sophisticated research equipments. Another extension of the present work could
include a strategic version of the framework and an endogenous model of a stochastic
network formation process.
Appendix A - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
(C) is immediate from (5). (IP) and (L) are immediate from (6).
(E): By concatenation, it suffices to prove the result for transitions. Consider an
elementary transition g → g′, with link ij added or deleted. Then
∑
k∈N
φg→g
′
k (v) = φ
g→g′
i (v) + φ
g→g′
j (v) = 2×
1
2
(v(g′)− v(g)).
Now, suppose that the transition is not elementary, with η created/deleted links. Along
each of the η! paths from g to g′, efficiency holds, therefore
∑
k∈N
φg→g
′
k =
1
η!
η! (v(g′)− v(g)) = v(g′)− v(g).
(D): We proceed in two steps.
1. We begin by showing that all null links can be discarded without change: φg→g
′
(v) =
φg→g
′\ij(v) if ij ∈ g′ \ g is null for v (a similar reasoning holds for ij ∈ g \ g′). Take such
a link ij. We have by (6)
φg→g
′
i (v) =
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ
(
v(g + εhijσ )− v(g + h
ij
σ − εij)
)
+
∑
ik∈g∆g′,k 6=j
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ
(
v(g + εhikσ )− v(g + εh
ik
σ − εik)
)
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with notation of (6).
Since ij is null, the first term in the above equation vanishes. For the second term,
we have
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ on g∆g′
(
v(g + εhikσ )− v(g + εh
ik
σ − εik)
)
=
|g∆g′|
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ′ on g∆(g′−ij)
(
v(g + εhikσ′)− v(g + εh
ik
σ′ − εik)
)
(note that hikσ′ is a set in the sequence {λσ′(1)}, {λσ′(1), λσ′(2)}, . . . , g
′∆(g−ij)). In summary
we get
φg→g
′
i (v) =
1
2|g∆(g′ − ij)|!
∑
σ on g∆(g′−ij)
∑
ik∈g∆(g′−ij)
(
v(g+εhikσ )−v(g+εh
ik
σ −εik)
)
= φg→g
′−ij
i .
2. By Step 1, we may suppose now that no null link exists in g∆g′. We proceed with
g′ \ g and players i not adjacent to leaving links, the case of g \ g′ being much that same.
If g′ \ g = ∅, then i becomes inactive and by (6) receive 0. We suppose then |g′ \ g| ≥ 1,
with all links in g′ \ g being symmetric, if there are at least two. By symmetry we can set
ν0(h) = v(g−h), ν1(h) = v(g−h+ij), ν2(h) = v(g−h+ij+kl), . . . , ν|g′\g|(h) = v(g
′−h),
with ij, kl, . . . ∈ g′ \ g, and h a set of links in g \ g′. Then for any i such that i ⇀ g′ \ g
and i 6⇀ g \ g′, we get
φg→g
′
i (v) =
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ
∑
ik∈g′\g
(
v(g + εhikσ )− v(g + εh
ik
σ − ik)
)
(7)
=
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
ik∈g′\g
( ∑
h−⊆g\g′
∑
h+⊆g′\g−ik
∑
σ
h−,h+
(
v(g − h− + h+ + ik)− v(g − h− + h+)
))
=
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
ik∈g′\g
( ∑
h−⊆g\g′
∑
h+⊆g′\g−ik
∑
σ
h−,h+
(
ν|h+|+1(h
−)− ν|h+|(h
−)
))
,
where σh−,h+ is any permutation putting first links in h
− ∪h+ in any order. Observe that
K =
∑
h−⊆g\g′
∑
h+⊆g′\g−ik
∑
σ
h−,h+
(
ν|h+|+1(h
−)− ν|h+|(h
−)
)
(8)
is constant for every ik ∈ g′ \ g. Therefore
φg→g
′
i (v) =
ℓi(g
′ \ g)
2|g∆g′|!
K,
the desired result.
(ASEL): Consider that links in (g \ g′)∗ and in (g′ \ g)∗ are symmetric for v, and that
any two links λ ∈ (g \ g′)∗, λ′ ∈ (g′ \ g)∗ are antisymmetric for v. Take i, j ∈ N such that
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(g \ g′)∗ 6↼ i ⇀ (g′ \ g)∗, and (g′ \ g)∗ 6↼ j ⇀ (g \ g′)∗. We have by (6):
φg→g
′
i (v) =
1
2|(g∆g′)∗|
∑
ik∈(g′\g)∗
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗
h+⊆(g′\g)∗−ik
|h+∪h−|=m
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
(
v(g + h+ − h− + ik)
− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
φg→g
′
j (v) =
1
2|(g∆g′)∗|
∑
jℓ∈(g\g′)∗
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−jℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
|h+∪h−|=m
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
(
v(g + h+ − h− − jℓ)
− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
,
which we rewrite simply as
φg→g
′
i (v) =
1
2|(g∆g′)∗|
∑
ik∈(g′\g)∗
φg→g
′
i,ik (v)
φg→g
′
j (v) =
1
2|(g∆g′)∗|
∑
jℓ∈(g\g′)∗
φg→g
′
j,jℓ (v).
Let us prove that φg→g
′
i,ik (v) = φ
g→g′
j,jℓ (v) using the fact that ik and jℓ are antisymmetric
for v, that is, v(g′′ + ik) = v(g′′ − jℓ) for every graph jℓ ∈ g′′ 6∋ ik:
φg→g
′
j,jℓ (v) =
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
( ∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−jℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
h+ 6∋ik
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ − h− − jℓ)− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
+
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−jℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
h+∋ik
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ − h− − jℓ)− v(g + h+ − h−)
))
=
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
( ∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−jℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
h+ 6∋ik
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ + ik − h−)− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
+
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−jℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
h+∋ik
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ − h− − jℓ)− v(g + h+ − ik − h− − jℓ)
))
.
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After a slight rewriting of φg→g
′
i,ik (v):
φg→g
′
i,ik (v) =
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
( ∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗
h+⊆(g′\g)∗−ik
h− 6∋jℓ
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ − h− + ik)− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
+
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗
h+⊆(g′\g)∗−ik
h−∋jℓ
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ − h− + ik)− v(g + h+ − h−)
))
=
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
( ∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗
h+⊆(g′\g)∗−ik
h− 6∋jℓ
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ + ik − h−)− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
+
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−jℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
h+∋ik
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ − h− − jℓ)− v(g + h+ − ik − h− − jℓ)
))
we see that φg→g
′
i,ik (v) = φ
g→g′
j,jℓ (v), as desired. Now, by symmetry, φ
g→g′
i,ik (v) = φ
g→g′
i,ik′ (v) for
every two links ik, ik′ ∈ (g′ \ g)∗, and similarly for φg→g
′
j,jℓ (v), which proves the result.
We address now the case where a node i is adjacent to links both in (g′ \ g)∗ and
(g \ g′)∗. In this case, we have:
φg→g
′
i (v) =
1
2|(g∆g′)∗|
( ∑
ik∈(g′\g)∗
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗
h+⊆(g′\g)∗−ik
|h+∪h−|=m
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
(
v(g + h+ − h− + ik)
− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
+
∑
iℓ∈(g\g′)∗
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−iℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
|h+∪h−|=m
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
(
v(g + h+ − h− − iℓ)
− v(g + h+ − h−)
))
=
1
2|(g∆g′)∗|
( ∑
ik∈(g′\g)∗
φg→g
′
i,ik (v) +
∑
iℓ∈(g\g′)∗
φg→g
′
i,iℓ (v)
)
.
Proceeding exactly as above shows that φg→g
′
i,ik (v) = φ
g→g′
i,iℓ (v). Now, by symmetry of all
links in (g′ \ g)∗, φg→g
′
i,ik (v) = φ
g→g′
i,ik′ (v) for any ik, ik
′ ∈ (g′ \ g)∗, and similarly for links in
(g \ g′)∗, which proves the result. 
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Proof of Theorem 1
We begin by proving two technical lemmas characterizing symmetric and antisymmetric
links in terms of the Mo¨bius transform of v.
Lemma 2 Distinct links λ, λ′ are symmetric for v if and only if they are symmetric for
mv:
mv(g + λ) = mv(g + λ′), ∀g 6∋ λ, λ′.
Proof: λ, λ′ are symmetric for v if v(g + λ) = v(g + λ′) for all g 6∋ λ, λ′, which is
equivalent to
0 =
∑
h⊆g+λ
mv(h)−
∑
h⊆g+λ′
mv(h) =
∑
h⊆g
(mv(h + λ)−mv(h+ λ′)), ∀g 6∋ λ, λ′.
For g = g∅ this gives mv(λ) = mv(λ′). For g = {λ′′} we obtain mv(λ′′+λ) = mv(λ′′+λ′).
Continuing the process we find the desired result. 
We can prove similarly:
Lemma 3 Distinct links λ, λ′ are antisymmetric for v if and only if
mv(g + λ+ λ′) = −mv(g + λ)−mv(g + λ′), ∀g 6∋ λ, λ′,
where mv is the Mo¨bius inverse of v (see (1)).
We know by Proposition 2 that the LBD rule satisfies all these axioms. It remains to
show uniqueness. By (L) and (C), it suffices to prove that for any unanimity game uh,
any transition g → g′, ψg→g
′
(uh) is uniquely determined.
We consider the unanimity game uh, h ⊆ g
N . Inactive players are those not adjacent
to g∆g′ and receive 0 by (IP). Now, by Lemma 1, links not in h are null. Therefore, if an
active player is not adjacent to a link both in h and in g∆g′, by (D) he receives 0. Then
by (E), (D) and (IP) we have in any situation:
uh(g
′)− uh(g) =
∑
i⇀h∩(g∆g′)
ψg→g
′
i (uh), (9)
and ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0 if i 6⇀ h ∩ (g∆g
′).
1. We suppose g ⊆ g′. From (9), we have:
(i) If h ∩ (g′ \ g) = ∅, ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0 for all i;
(ii) If h ∩ (g′ \ g) = {ij} (only one nonnull link), by (D) it follows that
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = ψ
g→g′
j (uh) =
uh(g
′)− uh(g)
2
,
and the other players adjacent to g′ \ g receive 0;
(iii) If |h∩ (g′ \ g)| > 1, by Lemma 1, all links in h∩ (g′ \ g) are symmetric. Hence by (D),
we find for any player i adjacent to (g′ \ g)∗ = h ∩ (g′ \ g):
ψg→g
′
i (uh) =
ℓi(h ∩ (g
′ \ g))(uh(g
′)− uh(g))∑
j⇀h∩(g′\g) ℓj(h ∩ (g
′ \ g))
, (10)
and the others receive 0.
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Finally,
uh(g
′)− uh(g) =
{
1, if h ⊆ g′ and h 6⊆ g
0, otherwise.
(11)
Combining the above results and (11), ψg→g
′
(uh) is uniquely determined.
2. The case g′ ⊆ g proceeds similarly.
3. We suppose g \ g′ 6= ∅ and g′ \ g 6= ∅. Observe that
uh(g
′)− uh(g) =


1, if h ⊆ g′ and h 6⊆ g ∩ g′
−1, if h ⊆ g and h 6⊆ g ∩ g′
0, otherwise.
(12)
3.1. Suppose h ⊆ g′ and h 6⊆ g∩g′, hence h∩ (g∆g′) 6= ∅ and h∩ (g∆g′) = h∩ (g′ \ g).
Using (9), we can proceed as in case 1:
(i) If h ∩ (g′ \ g) = {ij}, by (D) it follows that
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = ψ
g→g′
j (uh) =
1
2
.
(ii) If |h ∩ (g′ \ g)| > 1, we find for any player i adjacent to (g′ \ g)∗ = h ∩ (g∆g′):
ψg→g
′
i (uh) =
ℓi(h ∩ (g∆g
′))∑
j⇀h∩(g∆g′) ℓj(h ∩ (g∆g
′))
, (13)
and the others receive 0.
3.2. The case h ⊆ g and h 6⊆ g ∩ g′ proceeds similarly and yields for any player i
adjacent to (g \ g′)∗
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = −
ℓi(h ∩ (g∆g
′))∑
j⇀h∩(g∆g′) ℓj(h ∩ (g∆g
′))
, (14)
and the others receive 0.
3.3 Suppose h ⊆ g ∩ g′. Then all links in g∆g′ are null, hence
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0, ∀i ∈ N. (15)
3.4 Suppose h 6⊆ g and h 6⊆ g′. Equation (9) becomes:∑
i⇀h∩(g∆g′)
ψg→g
′
i (uh) =
∑
i⇀h∩(g′\g)
& i 6⇀h∩(g\g′)
ψg→g
′
i (uh)+
∑
i⇀h∩(g\g′)
& i 6⇀h∩(g′\g)
ψg→g
′
i (uh)+
∑
i⇀h∩(g′\g)
& i⇀h∩(g\g′)
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0.
(16)
3.4.1. Suppose h ∩ (g′ \ g) = ∅. Then (16) reduces to∑
i⇀h∩(g\g′)
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0.
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By Lemma 1(ii), all links in h∩ (g \ g′) are symmetric if there are at least two. Then (D)
implies ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0 for all i ⇀ h ∩ (g∆g
′), and by (IP)
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0, ∀i ∈ N. (17)
3.4.2. The case h ∩ (g \ g′) = ∅ proceeds similarly, and we also find (17).
3.4.3 Suppose h ∩ (g′ \ g) 6= ∅ and h ∩ (g \ g′) 6= ∅. We proceed by induction on
|h ∩ (g′ \ g)|.
We consider first that h ∩ (g′ \ g) = {ij} and the game v = uh − uh−ij. Applying
Lemma 3, it is easy to check that ij and kl are antisymmetric for v, for any kl ∈ h∩(g\g′).
Also, all links in h ∩ (g \ g′) are symmetric for v when there are at least two links. Then
it follows from (ASEL) w.r.t. v that
ψg→g
′
i (v)
ℓi(h ∩ (g∆g′))
=
ψg→g
′
j (v)
ℓj(h ∩ (g∆g′))
=
ψg→g
′
k (v)
ℓk(h ∩ (g∆g′))
=
ψg→g
′
l (v)
ℓl(h ∩ (g∆g′))
which by linearity (L) turns into
ψg→g
′
i (uh)− ψ
g→g′
i (uh−ij)
ℓi(h ∩ (g∆g′))
=
ψg→g
′
j (uh)− ψ
g→g′
j (uh−ij)
ℓj(h ∩ (g∆g′))
=
ψg→g
′
k (uh)− ψ
g→g′
k (uh−ij)
ℓk(h ∩ (g∆g′))
=
ψg→g
′
l (uh)− ψ
g→g′
l (uh−ij)
ℓl(h ∩ (g∆g′))
.
Since (h − ij) ∩ (g′ \ g) = ∅, we are back either to case 3.2 (if h − ij ⊆ g) or case 3.4.1.
(otherwise). In the latter case, ψg→g
′
(uh−ij) = 0 and we obtain
ψg→g
′
i (uh)
ℓi(h ∩ (g∆g′))
=
ψg→g
′
j (uh)
ℓj(h ∩ (g∆g′))
=
ψg→g
′
k (uh)
ℓk(h ∩ (g∆g′))
=
ψg→g
′
l (uh)
ℓl(h ∩ (g∆g′))
. (18)
In the former case, (14) applies to k and l, while i, j receive 0 with uh−ij. This yields:
ψg→g
′
i (uh)
ℓi(h ∩ (g∆g′))
=
ψg→g
′
j (uh)
ℓj(h ∩ (g∆g′))
=
ψg→g
′
k (uh) + ℓk((h− ij) ∩ (g∆g
′))/L
ℓk(h ∩ (g∆g′))
=
ψg→g
′
l (uh) + ℓl((h− ij) ∩ (g∆g
′))/L
ℓl(h ∩ (g∆g′))
, (19)
with L =
∑
i′⇀(h−ij)∩(g∆g′) ℓi′((h − ij) ∩ (g∆g
′)). Now, consider again equation (16).
Observe that ψg→g
′
i (uh), ψ
g→g′
j (uh), ψ
g→g′
k (uh) and ψ
g→g′
l (uh) are variables in this equation.
Moreover, we can apply (D) w.r.t. uh to the nodes i
′ in the second term (those adjacent
to h∩ (g \ g′) but not to h∩ (g′ \ g)), while the first and third term can only concern i or
j or both. It follows that (16) contains only the variables ψg→g
′
i (uh), ψ
g→g′
j (uh), ψ
g→g′
k (uh)
and ψg→g
′
l (uh). Substituting into it the different equalities in (18) or (19) determine these
variables uniquely. Note that in the case of (18), all active players receive 0.
Suppose now that ψg→g
′
i (uh) is known till |h ∩ (g
′ \ g)| = m < |g′ \ g| and let us
determine ψg→g
′
(uh) when |h ∩ (g
′ \ g)| = m+ 1. Consider the game
v =
∑
h′⊆h∩(g′\g)
(−1)|h
′|uh\h′.
25
We claim that any ij ∈ h∩ (g′ \ g) and any kℓ ∈ h∩ (g \ g′) are antisymmetric for v, and
that moreover all ij ∈ h ∩ (g′ \ g) are symmetric for v, and so are all links in h ∩ (g \ g′).
Proof of the Claim: The values of the Mo¨bius inverse of v are 1 for h, −1 for
h−ij, 1 for h−ij−i′j′, −1 for h−ij−i′j′−i′′j′′, etc., with ij, i′j′, i′′j′′ ∈ h∩(g′\g),
and 0 otherwise. Let us check antisymmetry for ij ∈ h∩(g′\g) and kℓ ∈ h∩(g\g′)
by Lemma 3. We must check that
mv(g + ij + kℓ) = −mv(g + ij)−mv(g + kℓ), ∀g 6∋ ij, kℓ.
Observe that mv(g + ij) = 0 for every g 6∋ ij, kℓ. By construction either mv(g +
ij + kl) and mv(g + kℓ) are both 0 (if g 6= h − h′ − kℓ for some h′ ⊆ h ∩ (g′ \ g)
containing ij), or mv(g+ ij+kℓ) = −mv(g+kℓ) holds. In both cases, the equality
holds. Now, by Lemma 2, symmetry holds for any two links in h ∩ (g′ \ g) if mv
is symmetric for these links, which is the case by construction. Finally, any two
links in h∩ (g \ g′) are symmetric for v because they are symmetric for each uh\h′,
h′ ⊆ h ∩ (g \ g′).
Hence (ASEL) w.r.t. v can be applied to any pair of links ij ∈ h∩(g′\g) and kℓ ∈ h∩(g\g′),
and since by induction hypothesis, all ψg→g
′
(uh\h′), h
′ 6= ∅ are determined, it follows that
(18) holds, for any ij ∈ h ∩ (g′ \ g) and any kℓ ∈ h ∩ (g \ g′). Finally, the successive
substitutions into (16) determine ψg→g
′
(uh) uniquely. 
Appendix B - Independence of the axioms
We first easily establish the independence of (C), (L) with the other axioms. Indeed,
defining for a scenario G = g0, g1, . . . , gq the following value
ψG(v) = f(φg0→g1(v), φg1→g2(v), . . . , φgq−1→gq(v)),
where f is an operator different from the sum, satisfies all axioms but (C). Similarly,
defining for a scenario G = g0, g1, . . . , gq the value
ψG(v) =
q−1∑
t=1
(
⊕h⊆gN m
v(h)φgt→gt+1(uh)
)
with v =
∑
h⊆gN m
v(h)uh and ⊕ is an operator different from the sum, satisfies all axioms
but (L).
It remains to show that (E), (IP), (D) and (ASEL) are independent for the axioma-
tization of φg→g
′
(uh), for any transition g → g
′ and any unanimity game uh.
(i) Axiom (E): Removing the normalization constant 1
2|g∆g′|!
in (6) yields a allocation
rule satisfying all axioms except (E).
(ii) Axiom (IP): Define ψg→g
′
= φg→g
′
if 1⇀ g∆g′, and if not (1 is inactive):
ψg→g
′
i =


(1− α)(v(g′)− v(g)), if i = 1
α
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ
∑
ik∈g∆g′(v(g + εh
ik
σ )− v(g + εh
ik
σ − εik)), if i ⇀ g∆g
′
0, otherwise
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with same notation as in (6) and for some fixed positive α. It can be checked that
(IP) is not satisfied, but (E), (D) and (ASEL) are (the two last are satisfied because
either φg→g
′
is used, or only the 2nd and 3d lines in the above formula).
(iii) Axiom (D): Define ψg→g
′
to be identical to φg→g
′
, except when (g∆g′)∗ reduces to
one link, say ij, in which case:
ψg→g
′
i (v) =
1
3
(v(g′)− v(g)), ψg→g
′
j (v) =
2
3
(v(g′)− v(g)).
Then (IP), (E) and (ASEL) are satisfied but not (D).
(iv) Axiom (ASEL): Observe that (ASEL) is only used in case 3.4.1 in the proof of
Theorem 1, that is, for the game uh with h∩ (g \g
′) 6= ∅ and h∩ (g′ \g) 6= ∅. It suffices
then to take ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0 for all active players, i.e., those adjacent to h ∩ (g∆g
′).
Then (16), which is imposed by (IP), (E) and (D), is satisfied, but not (19), which is
imposed by (ASEL).
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